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Objective: The share of total abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) repairs performed by endovascular aneurysm repair
(EVAR) increased rapidly from 32% in 2001 to 65% in 2006 with considerable variation between states. We hypothesized
that hospitals in competitive markets were early EVAR adopters and had improved AAA repair outcomes.
Methods: Nationwide Inpatient Sample and linked Hospital Market Structure (HMS) data was queried for patients who
underwent repair for nonruptured AAA in 2003. In HMS, the Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index (HHI, range 0-1) is
a validated and widely accepted economic measure of competition. Hospital markets were deﬁned using a variable
geographic radius that encompassed 90% of discharged patients. We conducted bivariate and multivariable linear and
logistic regression analyses for the dependent variable of EVAR use. A propensity score-adjusted multivariable logistic
regression model was used to control for treatment bias in the assessment of competition on AAA repair outcomes.
Results: A weighted total of 21,600 patients was included in our analyses. Patients at more competitive hospitals (lower
HHI) were at increased odds of undergoing EVAR vs open repair (odds ratio, 1.127 per 0.1 decrease in HHI; P < .0127)
after adjusting for patient demographics, comorbidities, and hospital level factors (bed size, teaching status, AAA repair
volume, and ownership). Competition was not associated with differences in in-hospital mortality or vascular, neurologic,
or other minor postoperative complications.
Conclusions: Greater hospital competition is signiﬁcantly associated with increased EVAR adoption at a time when
diffusion of this technology passed its tipping point. Hospital competition does not inﬂuence post-AAA repair outcomes.
These results suggest that adoption of novel vascular technology is not solely driven by clinical indications but may also be
inﬂuenced by market forces. (J Vasc Surg 2013;58:596-606.)In 1999 endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) was
approved by the Food and Drug Administration as a novel
technology for minimally invasive abdominal aortic aneu-
rysm (AAA) repair. Between 2001 and 2006, EVAR adop-
tion increased by 105%.1 Recent data suggests that there
are geographic differences in EVAR utilization among
states. This raises concern about appropriate use of tech-
nology and has implications for health care spending
growth.2
The Congressional Budget Ofﬁce estimates that
technology-related changes in medical practices are the
major driver of healthcare spending and can account for
up to 62% of growth in real health spending per capita.3the Harvard Medical School,a Brigham and Women’s Hospital Center
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://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jvs.2013.02.014Data from the EVAR 1 trial conducted in the United
Kingdom demonstrated that total average cost of
aneurysm-related procedures for EVAR patients during
eight years of follow up is $4568 (USD) more than open
repair patients, while demonstrating no signiﬁcant
improvement in long-term aneurysm-related mortality
between EVAR and open AAA repair.4 These and other
data provide impetus to understand what factors drive
adoption of a potential costly technology.
Prior analysis of adoption factors is limited. We hypoth-
esized that hospitals operating in more competitive markets
may be more likely to adopt EVAR. Similar associations
have been demonstrated elsewhere in the adoption of lapa-
roscopic colectomy.5 Hospitals in competitive markets may
be more likely to distinguish themselves from their compet-
itors by offering new procedures or services, especially
when those procedures provide distinct differences in
patient experiences. In the case of EVAR, the choice
between bilateral groin incisions vs midline laparotomy
for traditional open AAA repair may attract patients seeking
a less invasive treatment. We also hypothesized that
increased competition would improve patient outcomes
including in-hospital mortality, length of stay, and postop-
erative complications. This is consistent with the general
economic notion that competition promotes improvement
in productivity, outcomes, and lowers cost.
We used the Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index (HHI) as
a measure of hospital market competition.6 HHI is a widely
accepted and validated measure of market competition used
Fig 1. Endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) adoption trends between 2001 and 2007 for nonruptured abdominal
aortic aneurysm (AAA) repairs.
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Commission, and other governing organizations to deter-
mine the degree of competition in various commercial
markets.7 For example, in 2008 the Department of Justice
used this index to rule that a proposed merger between
UnitedHealth Group and Sierra Health Services Inc
would substantially reduce competition (increase in HHI
of 0.1625) in the health insurance market in Nevada.8
METHODS
Data sources. We used the 2001-2007 Nationwide
Inpatient Sample (NIS) and 2003 Hospital Market Struc-
ture (HMS) ﬁles published by the Healthcare Cost and
Utilization Project to assess the impact of hospital market
competition on EVAR adoption and AAA repair out-
comes. NIS is the nation’s largest all-payer inpatient data-
base that provides a 20% stratiﬁed sample of community
hospital admissions.
In the HMS ﬁles, hospital competition is quantiﬁed
using HHI. Each hospital within a market has a share of
the market, as deﬁned by the number of discharges from
that hospital divided by the total number of discharges
from all hospitals in the market. HHI is calculated as the
sum of squared market shares for all hospitals existing in
markets deﬁned by geopolitical boundaries, ﬁxed radius,
variable radius, and patient ﬂow according to methods
described by Wong et al.6 It ranges from approaching
zero (highly competitive) to one (monopoly). HHI not
only reﬂects the number of competitors within a market,
but also the equity of distribution of market share. More
competitors leads to a more competitive market, but
more importantly balanced market shares among competi-
tors also has a strong effect on competition. HMS ﬁles are
published for linkage with 1997, 2000, and 2003 NIS data.
We selected 2003 data to analyze the impact of hospitalmarket competition on EVAR adoption after EVAR was
approved by the Food and Drug Administration in late
1999 and before it surpassed utilization of open-repair in
2004.1 Six hundred ﬁfty-two out of 994 hospitals surveyed
in the 2003 NIS had HHI data and were included in our
analysis. Entire hospital markets were not excluded if an
individual hospital in the market had missing HHI. A
hospital’s HHI incorporates the presence of all hospitals
in the market, even if a single hospital in that market
does not have its own HHI value.
Patient level observations in NIS were supplemented
with state-level data obtained from The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation State Health Facts online database
and Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care online database to
account for variations in malpractice claim payments,
number of vascular surgeons and total health expenditures
per state.9,10
Study design. Patients who underwent repair for non-
ruptured AAA (International Classiﬁcation of Diseases,
Ninth Revision, Clinical Modiﬁcation [ICD-9-CM]
441.4, 441.9) by open or endovascular technique (ICD-
9CM 38.34, 38.44, 38.64, 39.71) in 2003 at hospitals for
which HHI data was available were included in our analysis
(weighted n ¼ 21,600). Hospital markets were deﬁned
using a variable geographic radius that encompassed 90%
of discharged patients. This market deﬁnition accounts for
the fact that hospitals do not compete within conﬁned
geographic boundaries. We queried the same cohort of
patients for post-AAA repair outcomes including in-hospital
death, length of stay, vascular complications (including graft
complication, embolism, or infection), and major post-
operative complications as deﬁned by the National Surgical
Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP).11
Statistical analysis. EVAR and open AAA repair data
was plotted between 2001 and 2007 to analyze usage
Fig 2. Geographic variation in percent endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) utilization between 2001 and 2007: (A)
2001, (B) 2002, (C) 2003, (D) 2004, (E) 2005, (F) 2006, and (G) 2007. Gradation scale (as denoted in ﬁgure).
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greater than 10 AAA repairs was plotted for each year
between 2001 and 2007 using EpiInfo software published
by the Centers for Disease Control.12
We conducted bivariate logistic regression analyses to
determine the association between hospital competition,
and potential confounders, and the outcome of EVAR
adoption in 2003. State-level variables, including total
number of malpractice claims, average malpractice claim
payment, average number of vascular surgeons, and
average health expenditures per state, were included to
control for potential confounders considered in previous
studies.1 Patient comorbidities were controlled using the
Elixhauser method.13 Covariates that were signiﬁcant in
bivariate analysis (P < .05) were entered into a multivari-
able logistic regression model with backwards selection
for the dependent variable of EVAR use. Statistical signiﬁ-
cance was deﬁned by a type I error threshold of 0.05, cor-
responding to 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Propensity score-weighted outcome models were used
to control for treatment bias in the assessment of hospital
competition, as measured by HHI, on postoperative AAA
repair outcomes in 2003. Propensity scores were ﬁrst
generated using a multivariable logistic regression modelfor the dependent variable of EVAR repair using covariates
(patient demographics, comorbidities, hospital, and state-
level factors) signiﬁcant in bivariate logistic regression
analysis (P < .10).14,15 The inverse of each score was sub-
sequently used to assign a weight to each patient to bal-
ance their treatment probability. Using propensity-score
weighted data, individual multivariable logistic regression
models were generated to study associations between
hospital competition and postoperative outcomes of in-
hospital mortality, duration of hospital stay, vascular
complication (graft embolism, infection, or other compli-
cation), and standard postoperative complications as de-
ﬁned by NSQIP. Potential confounders considered earlier
were adjusted for in each model. All data linkages and
statistical analyses were conducted using SAS v. 9.2 (SAS
Institute, Cary, NC).
RESULTS
EVAR utilization trends. National EVAR adoption
increased rapidly between 2001 and 2007; 33.61%
(6 1.96) of total nonruptured AAA repair procedures
were performed by EVAR in 2001 compared with 72.20%
(6 1.14) in 2007. EVAR surpassed open AAA repair with
52.28% (6 1.87) utilization nationwide in 2004 (Fig 1).
Table I. Characteristics of EVAR versus open AAA repair patients
Variable
Weighted frequency (SE)
Total (weighted
N ¼ 21,600)
EVAR (weighted
n ¼ 10,480)
Open (weighted
n ¼ 11,120)
Age, years (mean) 72.64 (6 0.12) 73.55 (6 0.20) 71.59 (6 0.17)
Race
White 86.65 (6 0.60) 87.03 (6 0.88) 86.44 (6 0.87)
Black 3.15 (6 0.31) 2.81 (6 0.43) 3.33 (6 0.46)
Hispanic 4.18 (6 0.35) 3.90 (6 0.51) 4.43 (6 0.52)
Asian/Paciﬁc Islander 2.31 (6 0.27) 2.41 (6 0.41) 2.30 (6 0.39)
Native American 0.06 (6 0.05) 0.08 (6 0.08) 0.06 (6 0.06)
Other 3.65 (6 0.03) 3.77 (6 0.48) 3.44 (6 0.45)
Female sex 20.04 (6 0.51) 16.66 (6 0.74) 23.70 (6 0.68)
Median income by zip code
Q1 (lowest) 18.14 (6 0.56) 17.93 (6 0.82) 18.15 (6 0.80)
Q2 26.35 (6 0.64) 26.13 (6 0.95) 26.36 (6 0.91)
Q3 29.76 (6 0.67) 28.95 (6 0.98) 30.51 (6 0.97)
Q4 (highest) 25.75 (6 0.63) 26.99 (6 0.95) 24.98 (6 0.89)
Primary payer
Medicare 78.49 (6 0.60) 80.86 (6 0.84) 76.49 (6 0.88)
Medicaid 1.31 (6 0.17) 1.11 (6 0.23) 1.45 (6 0.25)
Private including HMO 18.36 (6 0.56) 16.12 (6 0.79) 20.18 (6 0.83)
Self-pay 0.48 (6 0.10) 0.29 (6 0.11) 0.66 (6 0.17)
No charge 0.10 (6 0.04) 0.09 (6 0.06) 0.11 (6 0.07)
Other 1.26 (6 0.16) 1.48 (6 0.26) 1.10 (6 0.21)
Patient county of residence
Large metropolitan 55.93 (6 0.66) 57.26 (6 1.02) 55.20 (6 0.98)
Small metropolitan 26.37 (6 0.61) 25.72 (6 0.91) 26.93 (6 0.89)
Micropolitan 9.71 (6 0.40) 9.99 (6 0.62) 9.25 (6 0.58)
Other 7.99 (6 0.38) 7.03 (6 0.54) 8.62 (6 0.57)
Comorbidity
Congestive heart failure 0.16 (6 0.01) 0.05 (6 0.03) 0.27 (6 0.11)
Valvular disease 0.11 (6 0.06) 0.09 (6 0.06) 0.13 (6 0.07)
Pulmonary circulation disorders 0.05 (6 0.03) 0 0.06 (6 0.04)
Peripheral vascular disorders 34.03 (6 0.84) 31.72 (6 1.04) 35.30 (6 1.21)
Hypertension 63.22 (6 0.71) 64.09 (6 1.03) 62.86 (6 1.01)
Paralysis 1.10 (6 0.12) 1.24 (6 0.20) 1.02 (6 0.18)
Neurologic disorders 2.25 (6 0.22) 2.20 (6 0.31) 2.34 (6 0.32)
Chronic pulmonary disease 32.71 (6 0.79) 29.88 (6 0.92) 37.07 (6 1.06)
Diabetes mellitus, uncomplicated 11.49 (6 0.43) 13.45 (6 0.68) 10.19 (6 0.52)
Diabetes mellitus with chronic complications 0.74 (6 0.10) 0.68 (6 0.14) 0.89 (6 0.16)
Hypothyroidism 5.36 (6 0.34) 5.26 (6 0.48) 5.47 (6 0.48)
Renal failure 3.90 (6 0.25) 2.74 (6 0.30) 4.97 (6 0.42)
Liver disease 1.09 (6 0.15) 1.13 (6 0.23) 1.07 (6 0.21)
Peptic ulcer disease without bleeding 0.02 (6 0.02) 0.02 (6 0.02) 0
Lymphoma 0.49 (6 0.08) 0.66 (6 0.14) 0.39 (6 0.11)
Metastatic cancer 0.46 (6 0.07) 0.69 (6 0.14) 0.32 (6 0.10)
Solid tumor without metastases 2.32 (6 0.19) 3.14 (6 0.33) 1.72 (6 0.21)
Rheumatoid arthritis/collagen vascular diseases 1.48 (6 0.18) 1.41 (6 0.26) 1.51 (6 0.25)
Coagulopathy 5.70 (6 0.41) 2.38 (6 0.37) 8.74 (6 0.66)
Obesity 4.55 (6 0.30) 4.50 (6 0.45) 4.74 (6 0.44)
Weight loss 1.56 (6 0.20) 0.44 (6 0.12) 2.31 (6 0.31)
Fluid and electrolyte disorders 13.65 (6 0.62) 6.09 (6 0.52) 21.06 (6 0.96)
Chronic blood loss anemia 1.02 (6 0.15) 0.64 (6 0.017) 1.41 (6 0.22)
Deﬁciency anemias 7.33 (6 0.46) 5.72 (6 0.58) 9.48 (6 0.70)
Alcohol abuse 1.89 (6 0.20) 1.39 (6 0.28) 2.48 (6 0.29)
Drug abuse 0.18 (6 0.06) 0.10 (6 0.07) 0.28 (6 0.11)
Psychoses 1.03 (6 0.12) 0.69 (6 0.14) 1.48 (6 0.20)
Depression 2.33 (6 0.22) 1.96 (6 0.30) 2.50 (6 0.33)
Died during hospitalization 2.96 (6 0.22) 0.95 (6 0.17) 4.40 (6 0.38)
Length of stay (mean) 6.66 (6 0.15) 3.54 (6 0.13) 9.08 (6 0.14)
Elective admission status 81.78 (6 1.23) 88.33 (6 1.60) 80.85 (6 1.14)
AAA, Abdominal aortic aneurysm; EVAR, endovascular aneurysm repair; SE, standard error.
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Table II. Hospital characteristics for EVAR versus open AAA repair patients
Variable
Weighted frequency (SE)
Total (weighted
N ¼ 21,600)
EVAR (weighted
n ¼ 10,480)
Open (weighted
n ¼ 11,120)
Hospital location
Urban 94.11 (6 0.01) 95.05 (6 0.35) 93.44 (6 0.33)
Rural 5.89 (6 0.01) 4.95 (6 0.35) 6.56 (6 0.33)
Hospital teaching status
Teaching 55.57 (6 2.80) 61.01 (6 3.88) 53.75 (6 2.57)
Nonteaching 44.43 (6 2.80) 38.99 (6 3.88) 46.25 (6 2.57)
Hospital bed size
Small 4.66 (6 0.01) 3.82 (6 0.27) 5.36 (6 0.25)
Medium 22.15 (6 0.01) 19.25 (6 0.61) 25.06 (6 0.58)
Large 73.19 (6 0.01) 76.93 (6 0.64) 69.58 (6 0.61)
Hospital control
Government or private, collapsed category 67.87 (6 2.57) 67.98 (6 3.66) 66.10 (6 2.39)
Government, nonfederal, public 3.06 (6 0.82) 2.67 (6 0.90) 3.55 (6 0.96)
Private, nonproﬁt, voluntary 20.59 (6 2.29) 22.77 (6 3.31) 19.45 (6 1.95)
Private, investor-owned 6.07 (6 0.91) 5.03 (6 1.36) 7.59 (6 1.08)
Private, collapsed category 2.40 (6 0.84) 1.54 (6 0.71) 3.31 (6 1.14)
Geographic region
Northeast 21.92 (6 3.00) 23.21 (6 4.37) 21.04 (6 2.41)
Midwest 24.37 (6 2.48) 21.73 (6 3.46) 26.79 (6 2.20)
South 37.02 (6 2.66) 37.62 (6 3.78) 36.13 (6 2.35)
West 16.69 (6 1.95) 17.45 (6 3.08) 16.04 (6 1.40)
Hospital market characteristics (mean)
HHI in market deﬁned by variable radius (90%) 0.16 (6 0.01) 0.15 (6 0.01) 0.19 (6 0.01)
State level data
State health expenditures per capita (2004) in $ 5207 (6 4.14) 5172 (6 9.16) 5241 (6 8.43)
State hospital adjusted expenses per inpatient day in $ 1444 (6 2.03) 1449 (6 4.07) 1441 (6 4.02)
Total number of paid malpractice claims per state 705.48 (6 44.91) 789.06 (6 61.37) 667.93 (6 36.79)
Average claims ($) paid per state 283,033 (6 1100) 278,906 (6 1783) 287,095 (6 1752)
Total number of hospitals per state 164.04 (6 1.17) 175.21 (6 1.99) 154.31 (6 1.87)
Average number of vascular surgeons per 100,000 per state 0.72 (6 0.01) 0.71 (6 0.38) 0.73 (6 0.38)
Vascular volume per hospital (mean)
Vascular volume per hospital estimated by total AAA repairs 48.66 (6 6.29) 59.63 (6 7.94) 41.26 (6 4.79)
AAA, Abdominal aortic aneurysm; EVAR, endovascular aneurysm repair; HHI, Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index.
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2001 and 2007 was also observed (Fig 2). The total number
of AAA repair procedures conducted between 2001 and
2007 did not signiﬁcantly increase. Approximately 39,500
total nonruptured AAA repairs were performed in 2001
compared with 38,972 in 2007.
Predictors of EVAR utilization. In 2003, a weighted
total of 21,600 patients underwent AAA repair at hospitals
for whichHHI data was available. Of these patients, 48.52%
(6 2.07) underwent EVAR. On average, EVAR patients
were older (73.55 vs 71.59; P < .0001) and a higher
percentage were male (83.34% vs 76.30%; P < .0001).
There were signiﬁcant differences in patient comorbidities
including higher incidence of congestive heart failure,
peripheral vascular disease, chronic pulmonary disease, renal
failure, coagulopathy, weight loss, ﬂuid and electrolyte
disorders, chronic blood loss anemia, alcohol abuse, and
psychoses in open AAA repair patients. There was signiﬁ-
cantly higher incidence of uncomplicated diabetes mellitus
and solid tumors in EVAR patients (Tables I-III). There
were no signiﬁcant differences in race or socioeconomic
status.EVAR patients underwent their procedure at more
competitive hospitals with lower HHI (mean HHI, 0.15
vs 0.19; P < .0004) and hospitals with higher AAA repair
volume (mean annual AAA repair cases, 59.63 vs 41.26;
P < .0001). EVAR patients were also more likely to have
undergone procedures at private, urban, and teaching
hospitals (Tables I-III). State-level factors were not signiﬁ-
cantly associated with EVAR use, including total number
of malpractice claims, average malpractice claim payment,
average number of vascular surgeons per state, and average
health expenditures per state.
In multivariable analysis, the effect of hospital competi-
tion on the dependent variable of EVAR use remained
signiﬁcant (odds ratio [OR], 1.127 per 0.1 decrease in
HHI; 95% conﬁdence interval [CI], 1.102-1.154; P <
.0127) after adjusting for age, sex , comorbidities, admission
status, and hospital location, ownership, and AAA repair
volume (Table IV). Total AAA repairs per hospital remained
signiﬁcantly associated (OR, 1.008; 95% CI, 1.005-1.011;
P < .0001) with EVAR adoption as did elective admission
status (OR, 1.704; 95%CI, 1.272-2.282; P< .0004). Older
patients remained at increased odds of undergoing EVAR
Table III. Bivariate analysis for outcome of EVAR versus open AAA repair
Variable OR 95% CI P value
Age, years (mean) 1.031 1.024-1.039 <.0001
Race
White Reference
Black 0.934 0.639-1.364 .7228
Hispanic 0.870 0.599-1.262 .4620
Asian/Paciﬁc Islander 1.042 0.615-1.765 .8787
Native American 1.253 0.078-20.213 .8737
Other 0.937 0.300-2.929 .9114
Missing 23.13%
Female sex 0.633 0.564-0.710 <.0001
Median income by zip code
Q1 0.884 0.704-1.109 .2867
Q2 0.853 0.678-1.073 .1749
Q3 0.865 0.690-1.086 .2124
Q4 Reference
Primary payer
Medicare Reference
Medicaid 0.800 0.524-1.219 .2985
Private including HMO 0.744 0.639-0.867 .0001
Self-pay 0.718 0.378-1.364 .3121
No charge 1.198 0.297-4.829 .7993
Other 1.173 0.696-1.977 .5498
Patient county of residence
Large metropolitan Reference
Small metropolitan 0.823 0.641-1.057 .1267
Micropolitan 0.817 0.626-1.066 .1366
Other 0.735 0.553-0.977 .0339
Comorbidity
Congestive heart failure 0.041 0.006-0.284 .0012
Valvular disease 0.491 0.146-1.657 .2519
Peripheral vascular disorders 0.759 0.671-0.857 <.0001
Hypertension 1.082 0.962-1.218 .1906
Paralysis 1.182 0.751-1.862 .4691
Neurologic disorders 1.071 0.807-1.421 .6334
Chronic pulmonary disease 0.724 0.656-0.800 <.0001
Diabetes mellitus, uncomplicated 1.335 1.158-1.540 <.0001
Diabetes mellitus with chronic complications 0.806 0.472-1.378 .4306
Hypothyroidism 1.037 0.831-1.295 .7480
Renal failure 0.519 0.388-0.695 <.0001
Liver disease 1.172 0.686-2.000 .5616
Lymphoma 1.835 0.927-3.634 .0814
Metastatic cancer 2.345 1.124-4.891 .0230
Solid tumor without metastases 1.845 1.360-2.502 <.0001
Rheumatoid arthritis/collagen vascular diseases 1.085 0.743-1.583 .6743
Coagulopathy 0.249 0.180-0.343 <.0001
Obesity 0.942 0.727-1.221 .6536
Weight loss 0.165 0.097-0.282 <.0001
Fluid and electrolyte disorders 0.244 0.201-0.296 <.0001
Chronic blood loss anemia 0.449 0.260-0.774 .0040
Deﬁciency anemias 0.602 0.476-0.761 <.0001
Alcohol abuse 0.565 0.361-0.884 .0125
Drug abuse 0.398 0.077-2.062 .2723
Psychoses 0.497 0.312-0.791 .0032
Depression 0.967 0.704-1.327 .8347
Elective admission status 1.845 1.447-2.352 <.0001
Urban hospital location 1.779 1.051-3.009 .0318
Teaching hospital 1.345 1.036-1.747 .0262
Hospital bed size
Small 0.982 0.487-1.979 .9591
Medium 0.607 0.439-0.839 .0025
Large Reference
Hospital control
Government or private, collapsed category Reference
Government, nonfederal, public 0.728 0.447-1.186 .2026
Private, nonproﬁt, voluntary 1.118 0.834-1.501 .4553
(Continued on next page)
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Table III. Continued.
Variable OR 95% CI P value
Private, investor-owned 0.671 0.379-1.189 .1718
Private, collapsed category 0.459 0.246-0.858 .0146
Geographic region
Northeast Reference
Midwest 0.730 0.463-1.151 .1762
South 0.923 0.618-1.380 .6977
West 0.975 0.602-1.580 .9177
Hospital market characteristics
HHI in market deﬁned by variable radius (90%) 0.192 0.077-0.478 .0004
Vascular volume per hospital estimated by total AAA
procedures in 2003
1.009 1.003-1.015 .0020
AAA, Abdominal aortic aneurysm; CI, conﬁdence interval; EVAR, endovascular aneurysm repair; HHI, Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index; OR, odds ratio.
JOURNAL OF VASCULAR SURGERY
602 Sethi et al September 2013(OR, 1.041; 95% CI, 1.032-1.051; P< .0001) as did males
(OR, 1.631; 95% CI, 1.379-1.931; P < .0001). Patients
with diabetes or solid tumors were more likely to undergo
EVAR, but patients with a number of other signiﬁcant
comorbidities, including peripheral vascular disorders,
coagulopathies, ﬂuid and electrolyte disorders, deﬁciency
anemias, solid tumors, and congestive heart failure were
less likely (Table IV).
Propensity score-weighted outcome models were used
to control for treatment bias in the assessment of com-
petition on AAA repair outcomes. Covariate balancing
between EVAR and open AAA repair patients was con-
ﬁrmed using bivariate logistic regression analysis (Table V).
The average in-hospital mortality for EVAR patients was
0.95% (6 0.17) compared with 4.40% (6 0.38) for open
AAA repair patients. Open repair patients were hospitalized
longer (mean length of stay ¼ 9.08 6 0.14 days) and had
a higher frequency of postoperative myocardial infarction
(MI), cardiac complications, pulmonary embolism, major
neurologic complication (cerebral vascular accident or
coma), and minor complications. EVAR patients, however,
had greater frequency of vascular complications (9.72% 6
4.23).
Multivariable logistic regression analysis in the
propensity-weighted outcome model revealed that hospital
competition was not signiﬁcantly associated with in-hospital
mortality, length of stay, or vascular, cardiac, neurologic, or
other minor postoperative complications following open
AAA repair or EVAR. Patients who underwent either
open AAA repair or EVAR at less competitive hospitals
(higher HHI) had decreased odds of postoperative MI
(OR, 0.048; 95% CI, 0.003-0.699; P < .0263) after adjust-
ing for AAA repair procedure type, patient age, elective
admission status, hospital teaching status, and patient
comorbidities.
DISCUSSION
Many factors can contribute to the variation in adop-
tion of new technology. In this article, we describe a novel
association between hospital competition and EVAR ad-
option using nationwide in-patient data. In 2003, whenEVAR was not the predominant mode of AAA repair,
patients who underwent nonruptured AAA repair at more
competitive hospitals were at increased odds of under-
going EVAR after adjusting for differences in patient
demographics, comorbidities, and hospital-level factors.
However, hospital competition was not signiﬁcantly associ-
ated with in-hospital mortality, length of stay, and most
major or minor postoperative complications; though pa-
tients who underwent AAA repair at more competitive
hospitals were at increased odds of postoperative MI. We
also conﬁrm previous reports that EVAR utilization has
increased since 2001, exhibits geographic variation, and is
now the most common AAA repair method.1,16,17
Factors driving EVAR adoption. Several potential
mechanisms can explain why greater hospital competition
was signiﬁcantly associated with greater EVAR adoption.
First, competitive hospital markets may also contain
competitive physicians who seek to distinguish themselves
through innovation and early adoption. Second, competi-
tive hospitals have higher volume, which may reﬂect
greater expertise and greater resources to be early adopters
of new technology. Finally, early adoption of EVAR can
result in secondary competitive advantage because of
signaling of innovation and increased revenues from related
patient care (imaging, cardiology support, etc). Market
forces have been studied as drivers of technology adoption
in other surgical and procedural specialties.5,18-24 For
example, hospitals functioning in more competitive
markets were more likely to adopt laparoscopic colectomy
for colon cancer resection between 2002 and 2007.5
Greater hospital competition has also been inversely asso-
ciated with adoption of 64 slice computed tomography
scanners.22 This contradicts the traditional economic
notion that competition should improve innovation and
diffusion of technology. Twenty percent of hospitals in that
study, however, did not report computed tomography
scanner ownership. Of those excluded, the majority were
for-proﬁt hospitals that may have been more susceptible to
market competition pressures.
There is also evidence that the adoption decision
making process is arbitrary. In a case analysis that
Table IV. Multivariable analysis for outcome of EVAR adoption
Variable OR 95% CI P value
Mean age, years (per 1 year) 1.041 1.032-1.051 <.0001
Female (vs male) sex 0.613 0.518-0.725 <.0001
Comorbidity (yes vs no)
Congestive heart failure 0.073 0.008-0.704 .0236
Peripheral vascular disorders 0.732 0.626-0.855 <.0001
Diabetes mellitus, uncomplicated 1.479 1.240-1.765 <.0001
Solid tumor without metastases 1.883 1.287-2.755 .0011
Coagulopathy 0.284 0.191-0.422 <.0001
Weight loss 0.364 0.185-0.717 .0035
Fluid and electrolyte disorders 0.275 0.215-0.352 <.0001
Deﬁciency anemias 0.602 0.467-0.776 <.0001
Admission status
Elective (vs emergent) 1.704 1.272-2.282 .0004
Hospital location
Urban (vs rural) 0.582 0.288-1.179 .1330
Hospital control
Government or private, collapsed category Reference
Government, nonfederal, public 0.582 0.288-1.179 .5367
Private, nonproﬁt, voluntary 0.816 0.428-1.555 .0281
Private, investor-owned 1.071 0.571-2.012 .8299
Private, collapsed category 0.494 0.203-1.201 .1198
Hospital market characteristics
HHI in market deﬁned by variable radius (90%)
(per 0.1 decrease in HHI)
1.127 1.102-1.154 .0127
Vascular volume per hospital
Vascular volume per hospital estimated by total AAA
procedures in 2003 (per 1 additional procedure)
1.008 1.005-1.011 <.0001
AAA, Abdominal aortic aneurysm; CI, conﬁdence interval; EVAR, endovascular aneurysm repair; HHI, Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index; OR, odds ratio.
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in EVAR adoption by academic health centers in Canada,
researchers reported that few stakeholders are involved.
Decisions in two academic centers were largely based on
perceived beneﬁt to patient outcomes, improved safety
and surgeons’ desire to innovate.25 Competitive advan-
tages gained by adopting EVAR may play an important
role in these decision making processes. We found that
other hospital-level factors including bed size, location
and ownership did not signiﬁcantly predict EVAR adoption
with the exception of hospital AAA repair volume. Hospi-
tals with more experience in EVAR repair may have addi-
tional resources and funding to adopt new technology.
Clinical indications may also explain EVAR adoption
trends. A recent study attributed variation in EVAR utiliza-
tion to geographic differences in the prevalence of diabetes,
vascular disease, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
with the premise that EVAR is reserved for sicker patients.1
We demonstrate that patients with diabetes and solid
tumors are more likely to undergo EVAR as are older
patients who may be considered higher surgical risk.
However, we also found that high risk patients with
multiple other comorbidities including peripheral vascular
disorders, coagulopathies, ﬂuid and electrolyte disorders,
deﬁciency anemias, solid tumors, and congestive heart
failure were signiﬁcantly less likely to undergo EVAR. In
2003, EVAR was not widely adopted. Surgeons with rela-
tively little EVAR experience may have initially employed
this technology in healthier patients who had fewercomorbidities. These results are of particular interest in
the context of recent discussion regarding increased efﬁ-
cacy of EVAR for patients with high presurgical risk
proﬁles. Patient demographics including race and socioeco-
nomic status were not associated with EVAR adoption.
Variation in average state malpractice claims, and average
number of vascular surgeons per state did not demonstrate
signiﬁcant associations either, conﬁrming previously pub-
lished data.1 Patients admitted electively were more likely
to undergo EVAR. This may be attributed to increased
time surgeons needed to evaluate patients and determine
anatomical suitability during these early years of EVAR
adoption.
Implications of hospital competition. As a driver of
EVAR adoption, hospital competition has important impli-
cations for social welfare, hospital costs, and health policy.
Ideally, competition between hospitals should improve
quality of care and patient outcomes. In one of the early
studies investigating this association, retrospective analysis
found that hospital competition led to lower rates of
adverse outcomes in nonrural elderly Medicare beneﬁcia-
ries hospitalized for heart disease treatment after 1990.26
We speciﬁcally investigated the impact of competition on
AAA repair outcomes including in-hospital mortality,
length of stay, and NSQIP complications anticipating it
would improve these measures of social welfare. Using
propensity score weighted multivariable analysis, we found
that competition neither improved nor worsened these
outcomes with the exception of postoperative MI as
Table V. Covariate balancing between EVAR and open AAA repair patients after propensity-score inverse weighting
Variable
Weighted frequency (SE)
EVAR (weighted
n ¼ 16,383)
Open (weighted
n ¼ 18,916)
Unadjusted
P value
Propensity-score
adjusted P value
Age, years (mean) 73.55 (6 0.20) 71.46 (6 0.16) <.0001 .8017
Female sex 16.66 (6 0.74) 24.01 (6 0.66) <.0001 .5505
Primary payer:
Medicare 80.99 (6 0.97) 76.55 (6 0.89) Reference Reference
Medicaid 1.11 (6 0.20) 1.32 (6 0.19) .2985 .8361
Private including HMO 16.10 (6 0.91) 20.45 (6 0.84) .0001 .9255
Self-pay 0.48 (6 0.14) 0.63 (6 0.13) .3121 .7636
No charge 0.11 (6 0.06) 0.09 (6 0.5) .7993 .8552
Other 1.20 (6 0.25) 0.97 (6 0.21) .5498 .3445
Comorbidity
Congestive heart failure 0.03 (6 0.03) 0.80 (6 0.15) .0012 .0375
Peripheral vascular disorders 31.72 (6 1.04) 37.97 (6 1.17) <.0001 .3251
Chronic pulmonary disease 29.88 (6 0.92) 37.05 (6 1.02) <.0001 .6471
Diabetes mellitus, uncomplicated 13.45 (6 0.68) 10.43 (6 0.51) <.0001 .2613
Renal failure 2.74 (6 0.30) 5.15 (6 0.43) <.0001 .1400
Lymphoma 0.66 (6 0.14) 0.36 (6 0.10) .0814 .9708
Metastatic cancer 0.69 (6 0.14) 0.30 (6 0.09) .0230 .8001
Solid tumor without metastases 3.14 (6 0.33) 1.73 (6 0.21) <.0001 .9014
Coagulopathy 2.38 (6 0.37) 8.92 (6 0.63) <.0001 .1347
Weight loss 0.44 (6 0.12) 2.62 (6 0.33) <.0001 .6525
Fluid and electrolyte disorders 6.09 (6 0.52) 21.03 (6 0.96) <.0001 .1501
Chronic blood loss anemia 0.64 (6 0.17) 1.41 (6 0.21) .0040 .4219
Deﬁciency anemias 5.72 (6 0.58) 9.16 (6 0.65) <.0001 .5411
Alcohol abuse 1.39 (6 0.28) 2.44 (6 0.28) .0125 .8940
Psychoses 0.69 (6 0.14) 1.38 (6 0.19) .0032 .1596
Admission status
Elective 88.33 (6 1.60) 80.40 (6 1.15) <.0001 .7870
Hospital control
Government or private, collapsed category 67.98 (6 3.66) 66.09 (6 2.37) Reference Reference
Government, nonfederal, public 2.67 (6 0.90) 3.56 (6 0.92) .2026 .7986
Private, nonproﬁt, voluntary 22.77 (6 3.31) 19.79 (6 1.98) .4553 .4181
Private, investor-owned 5.03 (6 1.36) 7.29 (6 1.02) .1718 .6679
Private, collapsed category 1.54 (6 0.71) 3.27 (6 1.09) .0146 .6887
Hospital location
Urban 95.83 (6 1.30) 92.82 (6 1.32) .0318 .9562
Hospital teaching status
Teaching 61.01 (6 3.88) 53.78 (6 2.54) .0262 .4749
Vascular volume per hospital
Vascular volume per hospital estimated by
total AAA repairs
59.63 (6 7.94) 41.72 (6 4.98) .0020 .5132
AAA, Abdominal aortic aneurysm; EVAR, endovascular aneurysm repair; SE, standard error.
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postoperative MI. There may have been unknown factors
associated with a higher risk of MI in more competitive
hospitals, such as referral of more complex patients to
larger hospitals, which we were unable to control for in our
model.
Our analysis was limited to 2003 when EVAR adoption
was still in an early phase of adoption. At this time, many
vascular specialists likely began performing EVAR in low
volumes. Their limited experience with this new tech-
nology may have modiﬁed the expected relationship
between increased hospital volume and improved AAA-
repair outcomes. Indeed, outcomes from early EVAR trials
may have reﬂected the experience of expert surgeons who
were pioneers in EVAR development. Further analysis ismerited to better understand these social welfare implica-
tions over time.
Traditional economics principles support the associa-
tion of greater competition among providers leads to lower
cost for consumers. However, in health care, evidence
suggests that competition may have no impact on cost or
may even increase costs. Greater competition is associated
with higher hospital gross charges for appendectomies,
carotid endarterectomies, bariatric operations, radical pros-
tatectomies, and pyloromyotomies.27 Data from the
EVAR1 trial in the United Kingdom estimates that during
8 years of follow-up, the total average cost of aneurysm-
related procedures for EVAR patients in the United
Kingdom is $4568 US more than it is for open-repair
patients.4 Competition, as a driving factor of EVAR
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care spending growth.
Vascular surgeons are not strangers to surgical innova-
tion. Technology adoption is multifactorial, but with
evidence that competition may increase these practices,
there is increasing concern about responsible acquisition
and use of technology, especially in light of ongoing ﬁscal
concerns.2 Although some technologies such as EVAR
prove to be beneﬁcial, many other technologies do not
demonstrate signiﬁcant clinical beneﬁt or are not cost effec-
tive. Leaders in vascular surgery should acknowledge the
impact of nonclinical factors such as hospital competition
as they guide the development and implementation of
future vascular technology.
Limitations. This study has several limitations. We
only analyzed the impact of hospital competition on
EVAR adoption and outcomes in 2003 because of the
availability of the HMS ﬁles at the time of analysis.
However, we believe 2003 was an appropriate year to
analyze this association because EVAR was still in the
early phases of adoption. While HHI is a validated
measure of competition, it is not perfect. HHI calcula-
tions do not account for hospital networks, consolida-
tions, or partnerships. The market deﬁnitions we used
may not account for large centers that attract patients
nationwide. Additionally, HHI data was not available
for hospitals from nine states. We were informed by
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project ofﬁcials that
data omission was random in nature and excluding these
hospitals would not introduce bias into our analysis.
Finally, there are a number of factors that may be associ-
ated with technology adoption that we were unable to
account for including, but not limited to, hospital oper-
ating margins, presence or absence of ancillary hospital
services, physician reimbursement schemes, provider age
and training experience, variation in regional regulations
for technology adoption, and hospital access to capital.
Many of these factors are either not quantiﬁed or not
available. We also did not account for surgeon or patient
preference in the adoption of EVAR. This is a difﬁcult
variable to quantify but nonetheless an important one to
acknowledge. These limitations withstanding, our analysis
linking hospital competition with greater early EVAR
utilization provides important insights into the adoption
of medical technology.CONCLUSIONS
Greater hospital competition is signiﬁcantly associated
with increased EVAR adoption at a time when diffusion
of this technology had just passed its tipping point.
Hospital competition does not inﬂuence post-AAA repair
outcomes. These results suggest that adoption of novel
vascular technology is not solely driven by clinical indica-
tions, but may also be inﬂuenced by market forces. These
results may help guide future healthcare policy designed
to limit growing costs associated with vascular technology
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